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Abstract Loan purchase and securitization by Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae
and private-label commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) grew rapidly during the 1990s and accounted for more
than one-half of the net growth in multifamily debt over the
decade. By facilitating the integration of the multifamily
mortgage market into the broader capital markets, securitization
helped to create new sources of credit as some traditional
portfolio investors—savings institutions and life insurers—
reduced their share of loan holdings. A model of commercial
mortgage rates at life insurers, expressed relative to a
comparable-term Treasury yield, was estimated over a twenty-
two-year period. The parameter estimates supported an option-
based pricing model of rate determination; proxies for CMBS
activity showed no signiﬁcant effect.
A wide variety of ﬁnancial markets have been characterized by the growth in
securitization during the past twenty years as numerous advantages accrue from
holding ﬁnancial assets in securitized rather than whole loan form. Risk-based
capital rules, the ﬂexibility to tailor cash ﬂows and risks to the preferences of
speciﬁc investors, liquidity and access to new groups of investors are some of the
reasons for the growth of securitization.
Securitization developed ﬁrst with single-family mortgage loans but was slow in
coming to multifamily and nonresidential mortgage markets. During the 1970s,
Ginnie Mae guaranteed multifamily mortgage-backed securities backed by FHA-
insured project loans and Fannie Mae purchased FHA-insured multifamily loans
for its retained portfolio. Freddie Mac introduced the ﬁrst secondary market plan
for conventional multifamily loans in the early 1970s and commingled a limited
volume of multifamily loans with single-family loans in its Mortgage Participation
Certiﬁcates (multifamily made up no more than 5% of the dollar volume of a
pool). Secondary market sales remained small and less than 1% of conventional
multifamily mortgage debt had been securitized by the end of 1979.
Both Fannie Mae (in 1983) and Freddie Mac (in 1984) began to issue mortgage
pass-through securities backed exclusively by multifamily loans. However, their92  Nothaft and Freund
efforts were muted when the market softened in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
resulting in credit losses. By the end of 1989, 13% of multifamily debt was held
in portfolios by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae or had been securitized, compared
with 41% of single-family debt. The limited scope of those early efforts reﬂected
the nature of the underlying multifamily loans: mortgage contracts were not
standardized, the collateral rental properties were heterogeneous and the
geographic concentration of properties made multifamily lending a more risky
undertaking.
Multifamily loans were included in the pioneering efforts of the Resolution Trust
Corporation in securitizing mortgages collateralized by income-producing
properties in the early 1990s. An important change took place in the mid-1990s,
as secondary market activity involving multifamily mortgages picked up sharply.
The growth was spurred by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae and by the issuance of
private-label, commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), which included a
substantial volume of multifamily debt. By the end of 1999, 33% of multifamily
debt had been securitized or was held in the retained portfolios of Freddie Mac
and Fannie Mae, compared with 60% of single-family debt.
A good deal of literature exists on the effects of securitization in the single-family
mortgage market. Securitization has facilitated the integration of the single-family
mortgage market into the broader capital markets and thereby reduced the severity
of business cycle troughs, and has led to lower mortgage rates.1 The effect of
securitization on commercial mortgage markets has received less attention. Several
efforts have studied commercial mortgages as a whole. For instance, Haney, Epley
and Liano (1997) examined the integration of the income-property mortgage
market with the overall capital markets. They concluded that Treasury yields led
commercial mortgage market yields during the 1980s, but more recently the yields
moved virtually in tandem. Sa-Aadu, Shilling and Wang (2000) modeled yields
for income-property mortgages as a whole and concluded that the emergence of
securitization during the 1990s was a ‘‘market-integrating force’’ between
commercial mortgage markets and broader capital markets. More recently, Maris
and Segal (2002) studied the determinants of CMBS spreads. However, these
studies did not examine multifamily mortgage markets except as an embedded
component of the larger commercial mortgage market.
This article examines the determinants of multifamily mortgage rates—general
market forces, risk factors speciﬁc to multifamily and securitization—with an aim
of identifying whether effects relating to broader commercial mortgage markets
also hold for multifamily mortgages. An overview of particular developments in
multifamily markets is presented to provide an understanding of the environment
in which this development took place. The article also discusses the institutional
reasons for the rapid emergence of private-label securitization as well as the post-
1998 slowdown in securitization. Finally, the determinants of multifamily-to-
Treasury yield spreads are modeled to explore the effects of securitization on
multifamily mortgage rates.Securitization in Mortgage Markets  93
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 Multifamily Mortgage Markets in the 1990s
The increase in importance of securitization in multifamily mortgage markets in
the 1990s was facilitated by low interest rates, strong credit demand and signiﬁcant
changes on the supply side of the market.
The Interest Rate Environment
The favorable interest rate environment in the multifamily mortgage market during
the 1990s was driven in large part by broader capital market trends. The general
level of interest rates was quite low during much of the decade. For the decade
of the 1990s as a whole, the ten-year Treasury (the underlying risk-free rate)
averaged 6.5%—considerably lower than the 10.5% average of the 1980s. In
addition, credit quality spreads in all ﬁnancial markets declined to relatively low
levels, especially during mid-decade.
Commercial mortgage markets saw similar developments. The Barron’s/John B.
Levy & Company National Mortgage Survey of mortgage rates for all types of
income-producing properties (which traces interest rate quotes of the same
maturity over time) indicates that between late 1997 and late 1998, rates had fallen
to the 7% range for ten-year, commercial real estate loans—the lowest level since
the survey began in 1983. A direct measure of multifamily mortgage rates is the
data collected by the American Council of Life Insurers (ACLI) on mortgage
commitments at life insurance companies. These data measure all commitments
and, thus, will be affected by changes in loan terms over time. Nonetheless, this
measure tells the same story; multifamily mortgage rates declined for most of the
decade of the 1990s before heading back up in 1999 and 2000.
Like corporate bond markets, risk premia in both multifamily and general
commercial mortgage markets showed a marked decline during the mid-1990s
when securitization was emerging as a serious market force. Exhibit 1 shows the
decline in spreads relative to comparable-term Treasury yields for both the ACLI
multifamily mortgage rate and the Barron’s commercial mortgage rate survey.
After a sharp increase in spreads starting with the period of ﬁnancial turmoil in
1998, spreads on mortgage commitments rose to levels close to, or somewhat
above, 200 basis points.
Demand for Funds. Demand for multifamily mortgage credit was strong
throughout most of the 1990s. One force driving that demand was the need to
ﬁnance additions to the multifamily rental housing stock through new construction.
During the overbuilding era of the mid-1980s, starts of multifamily rental units
(5 or more) peaked in 1985 at 451,000 units. After an eight-year correction,
activity bottomed out at only 99,000 units in 1993. Multifamily apartment starts
have increased considerably since 1993. After jumping by 86% in 1994 to 207,00094  Nothaft and Freund
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units, solid gains were also registered during the next two years. Since 1997, new
construction stabilized in the 250,000 unit range.2
Another source of demand for multifamily mortgage credit was a by-product of
rising prices of existing multifamily rental structures. Many properties were
purchased at low prices earlier in the decade, and by the mid-1990s many owners
had built up considerable equity. Thus, borrowers could not only reﬁnance
mortgages in a low rate environment, but they could ‘‘cash out’’ by borrowing
against the equity gains.
The Supply of Multifamily Credit. A remarkable surge of capital ﬂowed into the
multifamily mortgage market during the second half of the 1990s, allowing the
growth in demand for funds to be accommodated without driving up interest rates
or stretching out settlement timelines. Between year-end 1994 and year-end 2001,
total multifamily mortgage debt outstanding grew by $187 billion. During the prior
ﬁve-year period, multifamily debt outstanding actually fell by $21 billion. Exhibit
2 shows the annual net change in aggregate multifamily debt outstanding as well
as the net change in holdings of major ﬁnancial sectors.Securitization in Mortgage Markets  95
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The demand for funds was not met by traditional sources of funds, however.
Portfolio lenders—primarily federally insured depositories and life insurance
companies—had been major players in the multifamily mortgage market. As late
as 1989, the combination of savings institutions and commercial banks held almost
half of all multifamily mortgage debt outstanding in their portfolios with another
10% held by life insurance companies. A decade later this total was down to 34%
for depositories and 8% for life insurers.3 Savings institutions led the retreat: their
share of the total market fell from 37% to just 15% during the decade of the
1990s. Commercial banks helped absorb some of that decline, with their share of
holdings of multifamily mortgages outstanding rising to 19% at the end of 2000
from 13% a decade earlier.4
Also of note is the role of the federal government as a net seller of multifamily
mortgages during the mid-1990s. Much of the large volume of multifamily
mortgages accumulated by the RTC and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation during the closing of problem institutions in the late 1980s and early
1990s were sold or extinguished, contributing to a net decline in overall federal
government holdings of nearly $15 billion during the 1991–1996 period.
The loss of market share by the federal government, thrifts and to some extent
life insurance companies during the mid- to late 1990s was offset by the growing
importance of secondary market activity. Between year-end 1995 and year-end
2001, the surge in multifamily mortgage holdings by Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae
and private-label MBS represented over half of the overall net increase in
multifamily mortgage lending, as shown in Exhibit 2.
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae have increased their presence in multifamily markets
signiﬁcantly since the early 1990s, adding over $55 billion during the four-year
period ending 2001.5
By far the most notable development in the multifamily mortgage market during
the upswing in activity starting in the mid-1990s was the surge in private-label
securitization of multifamily mortgage loans within mixed pools of commercial
real estate loans.
As shown in Exhibit 2, after averaging less than $2 billion a year over 1989 to
1995, the net increase in multifamily loans that were funded through private-label
conduits rose to $4 billion in 1996, to $5 billion in 1997, and during the ﬁrst half
of 1998 net multifamily debt packaged within CMBS reached a $16 billion annual
rate. The ﬁnancial turmoil during the third quarter of 1998 sharply reduced new
activity by private label conduits and, for the year as a whole, CMBS issuance
ﬁnanced a record of $12.9 billion in net multifamily debt. The popularity of this
ﬁnance vehicle has waned somewhat since its peak in the ﬁrst half of 1998.
Nonetheless, securitization of multifamily mortgages clearly was established as an




















Exhibit 2  Sources of Multifamily Mortgage Funds: Change in Multifamily Mortgage Debt Outstanding
(Billions of dollars)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Financial Institutions
Commercial Banks 4.7 2.3 0.5 1.1 0.8 0.9 4.6 2.9 5.3 3.5 13.5 10.2 7.2
Savings Institutions 4.7 14.2 11.9 10.1 2.4 3.0 2.4 0.4 2.0 2.7 2.3 1.9 3.2
Life Insurance Companies 2.3 2.1 0.4 2.1 0.3 0.3 0.9 2.0 0.3 1.1 1.3 0.9 0.8
Federal Agencies 1.4 12.5 6.4 4.9 2.7 2.0 3.2 1.5 0.6 1.0 2.1 2.2 2.8
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae 5.6 2.4 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.3 4.0 3.8 2.6 9.9 11.7 11.6 22.4
Private-Label MBS 0.0 0.1 2.3 3.4 1.8 1.4 2.1 4.0 5.0 12.9 8.5 6.5 8.1
REITs 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.9 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.3
Others 1.2 2.3 1.3 0.2 0.3 2.2 0.8 5.2 1.6 4.7 0.2 2.0 3.0
Total 10.5 2.1 3.9 12.4 2.9 0.3 6.3 15.7 13.5 30.4 38.6 34.9 47.2
Source: Flow of Funds Accounts, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; change computed yearend-to-yearend.Securitization in Mortgage Markets  97
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 Whence Multifamily Securitization?
Given the success of securitization in the single-family mortgage market, could
one expect a similar model would evolve in the multifamily sector? In the single-
family market, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae are able to achieve economies of
scale in both the production process and in raising debt. Perhaps most important,
their securities form a deep market that provides a substantial degree of liquidity.
While private label securitization exists, it is only important in certain ‘‘niche’’
markets like that for ‘‘jumbo’’ loans.
Emergence of Multifamily Securitization in the
mid-1990s
The difﬁculties faced by the multifamily and commercial mortgage market in the
late 1980s and early 1990s highlighted a major weakness in that market. Not
unlike the disrupting effect that disintermediation had on single-family lending in
the 1960s and the 1970s, the early 1990s demonstrated that reliance on a relatively
narrow set of portfolio lenders could result in disorderly market conditions when
those lenders experienced difﬁculties. Multifamily mortgage rates were relatively
high, and borrowers reportedly faced difﬁculties in obtaining loans.
These problems created opportune conditions for the growth in multifamily
mortgage securitization, and a conﬂuence of several economic and ﬁnancial
developments converted that potential into reality. First, the rapid growth in the
secondary mortgage market for single-family loans during the 1980s demonstrated
that securitization is an efﬁcient method of linking mortgage markets to capital
markets in general. The embryonic efforts by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae in the
1980s and by the RTC in the early 1990s also showed the feasibility of the
concept. Second, the cyclical recovery in commercial real estate markets—with
an especially healthy economic environment in the multifamily sector—reinforced
general market acceptance of income-property loans and, thus, encouraged
innovation. Third, signiﬁcant progress was made in standardization of loan
contracts. Freddie Mac began using uniform mortgage instruments in electronic
form in every state, and yield maintenance features that protect lenders against
prepayment risk became the industry standard. Finally, the explosion in
information and analytical technology made information easier and less costly to
process. This is important in income-property mortgage lending, as the risks of
lending depend on a fairly complex analysis of a complicated income stream.
By the mid-1990s, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae had increased their activity both
through direct securitization and by buying loans for their retained portfolios and
issuing corporate debt to ﬁnance them.6 However, it was the phenomenal growth
of CMBS issuance that was most surprising.
Some market observers, however, wondered how the investors in these securities
would react when the underlying real estate markets hit a bump and losses98  Nothaft and Freund
occurred. This was a particularly relevant question for the buyers of the lowest-
rated tranches of the CMBS who faced the ﬁrst-loss position. By mid-1998 the
spreads being paid for the considerable risks inherent in ﬁrst-loss positions had
come in considerably from the early CMBS issuances. This question was answered
in the third quarter of 1998. While no credit event occurred in the commercial
real estate markets, the market turmoil surrounding the international crises in Asia
and Russia was a watershed event for the CMBS market. Not only did risk spreads
widen for CMBS (as they did for most ﬁnancial instruments), but new issuance
fell off markedly in the CMBS market in general and for multifamily loans in
CMBS issues in particular. This retreat took place in a market in which the demand
for loans remained quite strong. Fortunately, credit access for multifamily
borrowers remained largely intact due to the continued loan-purchase activity of
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae.
The sharp fall off in CMBS issuance is consistent with several theories. When
borrowers are tied to open credit markets, they must compete directly with other
investments and, thus, are subject to market volatility associated with shifting
assessments of relative returns. As experience with ‘‘Wall Street’’ in the 1980s
and 1990s clearly demonstrated, ‘‘hot money’’ can shift in, or out, of a particular
sector quickly. This is particularly true if investors do not have a long investment
history in a particular instrument or are not ‘‘specialists’’ in a sector.
Other possible inﬂuences on the abrupt turn around in private-label securitization
of multifamily mortgages are speciﬁc to the sector and the instrument themselves.
For instance, during the ﬁnancial crisis of late 1998, many of the institutions that
were putting together CMBS issues were caught with commitments to borrowers
that were difﬁcult to fulﬁll. Thus, loans were ‘‘retraded.’’ Thus, borrowers had the
choice of paying higher interest rates than agreed upon or having their loans fall
through. In an industry where ‘‘relationship’’ lending long had been a tradition,
the situation likely soured many borrowers from going to conduits for the funds.
Also, the supply of lenders for the high-risk tranches narrowed radically,
presumably reﬂecting a general ﬂight to quality in ﬁnancial markets. In particular,
some so-called ‘‘B piece’’ buyers just evaporated—CRIMIE MAE being the case
in point. Without a buyer of the high-risk tranches, a CMBS issue will not go off.
Finally, the retreat of the CMBS market may reﬂect systemic weaknesses in the
private-label securitization of multifamily (and other commercial mortgage loans)
that were masked by the euphoria of the surge in CMBS issuance that culminated
in early 1998. In particular, the appropriateness and effectiveness of the evaluation
of credit risks may have provided a shaky foundation for the securitization boom.
Like other income-producing properties, the credit risk on a loan to a multifamily
rental property depends heavily on project-speciﬁc cash ﬂows. The prospects for
rental income—along with the depth of the borrower’s pockets and non-mortgage
expenses—determine the ability to meet debt service payments and form the basis
for the economic value of the collateral if the mortgage were to default.
The income stream for a property will depend on national, regional and area
economic trends. However, it has long been a tenet of commercial real estateSecuritization in Mortgage Markets  99
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underwriting that submarket, building-speciﬁc and individual lender performance
also are important determinants of future income prospects. Local, specialized
portfolio lenders are in an excellent position and have strong incentives to analyze
these local risks. Clearly, this position has not been a sufﬁcient condition for good
underwriting, but a case can be made that a strong base of local knowledge is a
necessary condition.
The private-label securitization process relies on another model for underwriting.
The originator of the loan—a mortgage banker, a depository or a Wall Street house
itself—does not necessarily intend to keep the loan (or an interest in it) on a
permanent basis. While many of the players have local knowledge, they can have
only long-term, relational incentives to underwrite carefully. To the extent that,
say, a depository originates, sells and retains mortgages, there is also an adverse
selection issue regarding which loans it chooses to keep and which loans it sells
for inclusion in a security pool.
Other players in the private-label securitization process—the rating agencies and
the ﬁrm doing the securitization but not keeping any interest—are fee-based in
their compensation. They typically are quite sophisticated and provide a multilevel
review of underwriting that provides valuable quality control. However, as the role
of appraisers in the commercial real estate debacle of the 1980s demonstrated,
fee-based parties without direct ﬁnancial interest in the outcome of the investment
can render cursory reviews or produce analysis that will ‘‘make the deal work’’
in order to continue to maximize proﬁts in the short run. Unless the private-label
securitizing agent retains a ﬁnancial risk in the transaction (typically through
holding the lower-rated tranches), the incentives for quality underwriting are lower
than for portfolio lenders or for Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, which provide pool
guarantees.
Finally, the ultimate investors in CMBS are, by deﬁnition, less familiar with the
credit (and interest rate) risks than a specialized portfolio lender in commercial
real estate. This removed position entails the most risk when the underlying
investment is not a standardized product and has a number of moving parts, as is
the case with many multifamily mortgage loans. In the securitization process,
ultimate investor judgments on credit risks and the compensation they require are
often derivative and done on a mass production basis (many loans at one time).
While this system is not inferior a priori and has some beneﬁts as noted above,
the potential for problems may be higher than for an institutional investor doing
its own research and due diligence on an individual loan. Thus, a systemic loss
of conﬁdence in the face of market adversity would seem to be a potential problem
in a world of derivative knowledge.
 The Effects of Securitization on Mortgage Yields
An expansion in the supply of credit in a ﬁnancial market should lower interest
rates. The salutary effect of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae’s securitization activity100  Nothaft and Freund
on single-family mortgage rates has been much discussed (see Hendershott and
Shilling, 1989; and Cotterman and Pearce, 1996). The remainder of this article
will explore, based on available data, what inﬂuence the recent increase in
securitization has had on the cost of credit to ﬁnance multifamily properties.
The following discussion examines the effect of securitization on income-property
mortgage rates by studying their spread to Treasury yields. The only source of
data on multifamily mortgage rates available on a time series basis is the ACLI
data on loan commitments made by life insurers. These data are far from perfect;
in particular, they are not standardized for changes in terms and maturities.
Moreover, the data are limited to insurance company lending—a small segment
of the overall market—and are quarterly averages. Thus, as a check on the ACLI
results, the model was also applied to the Barron’s/Levy data for all income-
property lending discussed above; these data do hold term constant and reﬂect
pricing at all major institutional lenders. They, however, are only a survey of price
quotes—not necessarily actual transactions.
The Basic Model
Observed spreads on multifamily loans over Treasury rates can be explained at
times by idiosyncratic factors. For example, in the mid-1990s, it was often
observed that multifamily mortgages were in especially strong demand because
they were used to quality-enhance the pool of mixed commercial mortgages and,
therefore, yields on multifamily loans were driven down. However, the basic
determinants of such spreads are generally based on more fundamental factors.
Research on the pricing of mortgage loans has emphasized the value of the put
(i.e., default) and call (prepayment) options imbedded within the interest rate (see
Hendershott and Van Order, 1987; Titman and Torous, 1989; and Kau, Keenan,
Muller and Epperson, 1990). This literature suggests that the spread between
apartment mortgage rates and Treasury yields are to be determined by a few key
factors:
 First, lenders must be compensated for credit risk. Treasuries are free of
credit risk; income-property mortgages are backed by uncertain future
income ﬂows, marked by a long history of default problems.
 The costs of execution also require a higher yield for income-property
mortgages than Treasuries. The additional costs associated with such
mortgages include substantial origination and servicing expenses.
Origination costs are incurred to underwrite the loan and cover other
expenses, such as ‘‘brick and mortar’’ expenses for traditional portfolio
lenders or multiple layers of fee income to the various participants in a
securitization. Further, mortgage servicing costs are higher, as the
properties producing the cash ﬂows need continual monitoring and
payments must be processed monthly. In contrast, Treasury bonds are
risk-free and payments are semi-annual.Securitization in Mortgage Markets  101
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 Investors also require compensation for prepayment risks. In the case of
multifamily mortgages, prepayment risk is often minimized by the
contractual terms of the instrument. In the 1980s, ‘‘lock out’’ provisions
were common, and in the 1990s, market practice required a ‘‘yield
maintenance’’ premium to make the lender whole if a performing
mortgage were to prepay. In essence, this feature substantially reduces
the value of the call option, although the ability to prepay remains.
 The less the liquidity of the market in which a ﬁnancial instrument trades,
the higher the compensatory premium that one would expect to ﬁnd in
its yield. Multifamily and nonresidential mortgages have historically been
relatively illiquid. The activities of Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae and private-
label securitizations have been important factors in increasing liquidity
for multifamily mortgages. CMBS are generally more liquid than a whole
loan, but are still traded in a market with considerable less depth and
breadth than for Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae securities. In short, the
‘‘liquidity premium’’ embedded in multifamily mortgage rates relative to
Treasuries should have been reduced by the growth in securitization
during the 1990s.
 Determinants of Income-Property Mortgage Rate Spreads
Following Rothberg, Nothaft and Gabriel (1989), the basic model tested here
expresses the multifamily mortgage spread as a function of variables measuring
prepayment and credit risks as well as the level of private-label, Freddie Mac and
Fannie Mae activity; a similar equation is estimated for nonresidential mortgage
spreads. No other research has separately examined multifamily and nonresidential
mortgage spreads to Treasury yields. For instance, Corcoran (1989) modeled the
difference in returns between a portfolio of commercial mortgages and one
containing only Baa-rated industrial and utility bonds, and Sa-Aadu, Shilling and
Wang (2000) analyze the relationship between income-property mortgage rates
and 10-year Treasuries.7
The rate data discussed above were used as the basis for the dependent variables.
The ACLI data are available quarterly; the sample period used here begins with
the ﬁrst quarter of 1979. At that time the ACLI expanded its survey to include a
larger number of companies, thus expanding the number of mortgage
commitments included and improving the quality of the averages reported.8 The
Barron’s data captures rates on all income-producing properties; the results in this
study are reported for ten-year term mortgages.9 These data are available from
January 1983. All mortgage rate series were converted to bond-equivalent yields
for the analysis.
Two alternative forms of the dependent variable are modeled. One is the absolute
spread, measured as the mortgage rate less the comparable-term Treasury.10 This102  Nothaft and Freund
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measure is generally used by practitioners for lending and proﬁtability decisions.
The other is the relative spread, in which the absolute spread is taken as a ratio
to the comparable-term Treasury, as in Rothberg, Nothaft and Gabriel (1989). This
measure is appropriate if risk and illiquidity premia were viewed by the market
as a proportional add on to current rates rather than an absolute one. The relative
measure also may better control for differences in spread reﬂecting tax differences,
as income-property mortgage rates provide income to investors that is generally
subject to federal, state and local taxation. The absolute spread series are shown
in Exhibit 1 and the relative spread series in Exhibit 3. The independent variables
included are:
Credit Risk:
 The difference in the composite yields on corporate bonds rated A and
AAA by Moody’s, available from the Federal Reserve Board, was used
to capture the general capital market trends in evaluating credit risk.
 Several variables were tested as a measure of risks speciﬁc to multifamily
and/or commercial real estate. The most successful were variables
measuring the price of the underlying collateral asset: the one-year
(current quarter relative to one year ago) appreciation rate of commercial
properties or of apartment buildings. Both are available from NCREIFSecuritization in Mortgage Markets  103
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starting in 1979.11 Other variables, like the vacancy rate for apartments,
were tested as a measure of speciﬁc market risk, but they were not
successful.
Prepayment Risk:
 Notwithstanding the fact that multifamily mortgages often had lock out
or yield maintenance provisions to discourage prepayments, variables
were included to test to see if prepayment premiums affected overall
multifamily spreads. The primary variable in this regard was a measure
of historical volatility, measured as the standard deviation of daily ten-
year constant-maturity Treasury yields during the current and past three
quarters, derived from yield data available from the Federal Reserve
Board. Also tested, but not successful, was a dummy variable for periods
when nominal rates were unusually high. Both variables were meant to
capture the likelihood that signiﬁcantly lower rates during the term of
the mortgage could trigger early prepayment.
Mortgage Terms:
 The average loan-to-value ratio on loan commitments made by life
insurance companies, as reported by the ACLI, was tried to correct for
changes in the origination loan-to-value that could affect the dependent
variable. Term-to-maturity was also included to capture any shifts that
would affect reported rates.
Effect of Securitization:
 To measure the aggregate supply effect of securitization, a variable was
constructed measuring the quarterly net change in overall multifamily
mortgage debt held by Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae and private-label pools
taken together. It was expressed as a ratio to the amount of multifamily
mortgage debt outstanding, available from the Federal Reserve Board.
The variables are entered as a one quarter ‘‘lead’’ variable, as the loans
in a CMBS are typically priced, originated and warehoused months
before the security issuance. A second variable was tested, measuring
CMBS activity alone in the same manner.
Regime Shift Dummy Variable:
 The second half of 1998 was a watershed period in ﬁnancial markets in
general. The ‘‘irrational exuberance’’ with respect to credit quality
spreads that investors had before that period rapidly dissipated, and
overall market volatility increased. Moreover, commercial real estate
markets had recovered sufﬁciently that the premium being paid for
putting the relatively safer multifamily mortgages in mixed pools likely
had abated by the late 1990s. For these reasons, a dummy variable was
included taking the value of one starting in the third quarter of 1998 and
a value of zero before that quarter.104  Nothaft and Freund
Application of ordinary least squares (OLS) to model the ACLI relative and
absolute multifamily-to-Treasury spread series was found to have a heteroscedastic
error structure related to the number of observations used by the ACLI to compute
the quarterly average data.12 Thus, weighted least squares (WLS) model estimation
was used with the square root of the number of loans surveyed by the ACLI as
the weight. Furthermore, all models initially had low Durbin-Watson statistics
indicating positive serial correlation of the disturbances at a 95% conﬁdence level.
WLS estimates for the ACLI relative and absolute multifamily spread series are
shown in Exhibits 4 and 5, respectively, and for the ACLI nonresidential spread
series in Exhibit 6; all models are estimated from the ﬁrst quarter of 1979 to the
fourth quarter of 2000. The results of OLS estimation of the Barron’s commercial
real estate mortgage spread series from the ﬁrst quarter of 1983 to the fourth
quarter of 2000 are shown in Exhibit 7. The estimated ﬁrst-order autoregressive
parameter, shown as rho in the exhibits, was signiﬁcantly negative in all models.
Exhibit 4 shows the results of various regressions explaining relative spreads. The
results indicate that multifamily mortgage spreads clearly are dependent on general
capital market assessments of risk as measured by the quality spreads on corporate
bonds. Market volatility that would inﬂuence prepayment premia was not
statistically signiﬁcant, perhaps reﬂecting the widespread use of lockout and yield
maintenance provisions. The average loan-to-value ratio—entered to account for
changes in loan terms over time—was the correct sign but only marginally
signiﬁcant; the variable entered to control for term-to-maturity variation was not
signiﬁcant and was dropped. The variable capturing apartment market lending
risk—the rate of appreciation of apartment properties—has the expected negative
sign but was not signiﬁcant at the 90% conﬁdence level. However, the broader
measure of lending risk as captured by the appreciation rate of all commercial
properties was signiﬁcant and had the expected negative effect. Those measures
of the volume of securitization—both private-label and the combined measure—
were not statistically different from zero.13 The regime shift dummy variable was
consistently signiﬁcant, showing the expected upward shift in spreads, ceteris
paribus.
The results were quite similar when the independent variable was measured as an
absolute spread (Exhibit 5). The lending risk and loan-to-value variables were a
bit more effective. However, the variable measuring the net growth in securitized
debt was insigniﬁcant.
As suggested above, similar tests were run on overall commercial mortgage rates
to validate the ﬁndings for multifamily mortgages. The results were quite similar.
The estimates using the ACLI nonresidential data are reported in Exhibit 6. The
A-AAA yield spread again proved to be the key driving force for commercial
mortgage spreads. Interestingly, the yield spread between A-rated and AAA-rated
bonds had a consistently larger coefﬁcient in the nonresidential models, perhaps
reﬂecting the greater correspondence of credit risk of corporate real estate with
the ﬁnancial health of the corporate occupants. Like the multifamily mortgage
























































Exhibit 4  Determinants of Conventional Multifamily Mortgage Rate Spreads
123456
Intercept 0.12 0.09 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15
(2.22) (0.57) (0.96) (0.93) (0.89) (0.82)
A-AAA Corporate Bond Spread 2.08 2.05 1.94 1.94 2.16 2.16
(4.78) (4.71) (4.39) (4.37) (4.78) (4.78)
Market Volatility: Standard Deviation of 10-year Treasuries 0.28 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.13 0.15
(0.80) (0.33) (0.11) (0.12) (0.35) (0.38)
Appreciation Rate of All Commercial Properties 0.77 0.76 0.75 0.75
(2.39) (2.09) (2.40) (2.34)
Appreciation Rate of Apartment Properties 0.41 0.40
(1.52) (1.46)
Average Loan-to-Value Ratio 0.28 0.37 0.37 0.35 0.34
(1.37) (1.75) (1.71) (1.65) (1.56)
Average Term to Maturity 0.00
(0.14)
Change in Private-Label Multifamily Securitization 1.53 1.16
(0.71) (0.54)
Change in Private-Label, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae Securitization 0.49 0.12
(0.45) (0.12)
Post–1998 Dummy Variable 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08
(3.04) (2.87) (2.47) (2.44) (2.18) (2.19)
Rho 0.68 0.61 0.43 0.55 0.62 0.71
(8.45) (6.86) (4.26) (5.78) (7.02) (9.03)
R2 .88 .88 .88 .88 .88 .88
Durbin-Watson 1.99 1.97 2.01 2.00 2.06 2.05
Notes: The dependent variable is ACLI Absolute Spread to Comparable-Term Treasury. Models estimated with quarterly data from the ﬁrst quarter of 1979




















Exhibit 5  Determinants of Conventional Multifamily Mortgage Rate Spreads
123456
Intercept 1.49 0.29 0.94 0.81 0.62 0.51
(5.64) (0.26) (0.77) (0.66) (0.49) (0.40)
A-AAA Corporate Bond Spread 0.70 0.73 0.73 0.71 0.72 0.71
(3.57) (3.99) (3.87) (3.65) (3.07) (2.98)
Market Volatility: Standard Deviation of 10-year Treasuries 1.49 0.18 0.16 0.02 0.47 0.53
(0.80) (0.09) (0.08) (0.01) (0.20) (0.23)
Appreciation Rate of All Commercial Properties 5.66 6.70 5.58 5.65
(4.63) (4.95) (4.90) (4.69)
Appreciation Rate of Apartment Properties 3.54 3.45
(2.47) (2.36)
Average Loan-to-Value Ratio 1.79 3.06 2.91 2.81 2.69
(1.27) (1.98) (1.89) (1.80) (1.71)
Average Term to Maturity 0.00
(1.44)
Change in Private-Label Multifamily Securitization 21.06 12.99
(1.48) (0.86)
Change in Private Label, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae Securitization 8.86 3.69
(1.16) (0.48)
Post-1998 Dummy Variable 0.61 0.65 0.51 0.50 0.37 0.38
(3.41) (3.85) (2.72) (2.57) (1.71) (1.69)
Rho 0.49 0.40 0.36 0.44 0.54 0.57
(5.05) (3.92) (3.48) (4.34) (5.67) (6.24)
R2 .83 .83 .83 .83 .81 .81
Durbin-Watson 1.94 1.91 1.96 1.96 2.05 2.05
Notes: The dependent variable is ACLI Absolute Spread to Comparable-Term Treasury. Models estimated with quarterly data from the ﬁrst quarter of 1979
























































Exhibit 6  Determinants of Nonresidential Mortgage Rate Spreads
Absolute Spread Relative Spread
123456
Intercept 1.39 0.93 0.91 0.06 0.04 0.01
(4.83) (0.65) (0.62) (1.01) (0.17) (0.04)
A-AAA Corporate Bond Spread 0.86 0.82 0.83 2.52 2.53 2.45
(3.90) (3.82) (3.71) (6.60) (6.54) (6.19)
Market Volatility: Standard Deviation of 10-year Treasuries 1.34 0.82 1.01 0.01 0.03 0.02
(0.69) (0.42) (0.51) (0.02) (0.10) (0.05)
Appreciation Rate of All Commercial Properties 6.74 7.86 6.69 0.43 0.50 0.44
(4.14) (4.10) (4.17) (1.15) (1.16) (1.15)
Average Loan-to- Value Ratio 0.26 0.62 0.10 0.09
(0.14) (0.32) (0.35) (0.31)
Average Term to Maturity 0.00 0.00
(0.93) (0.33)
Change in Private-Label Nonresidential Securitization 5.62 0.02
(0.48) (0.01)
Post-1998 Dummy Variable 0.72 0.81 0.65 0.08 0.08 0.07
(3.79) (4.25) (2.91) (2.24) (2.24) (1.85)
Rho 0.50 0.46 0.41 0.62 0.57 0.36
(5.27) (4.60) (4.02) (7.22) (6.23) (3.39)
R2 .77 .77 .75 .88 .88 .87
Durbin-Watson 1.98 1.96 1.99 2.13 2.13 2.14
Notes: The dependent variable is ACLI Nonresidential Mortgage Spread to Comparable-Term Treasury. Models estimated with quarterly data from the ﬁrst




















Exhibit 7  Determinants of Ten-Year Spreads
Absolute Spread Relative Spread
123456
Intercept 0.98 1.00 0.97 0.09 0.09 0.08
(6.31) (6.12) (5.92) (2.11) (2.04) (1.92)
A-AAA Corporate Bond Spread 0.58 0.56 0.58 1.02 0.96 0.94
(5.74) (5.39) (5.57) (3.50) (3.19) (3.16)
Market Volatility: Standard Deviation of 10-year Treasuries 3.08 3.07 3.13 0.57 0.59 0.63
(2.92) (2.86) (2.92) (2.10) (2.16) (2.29)
Appreciation Rate of All Commercial Properties 5.00 4.98 5.03 0.70 0.71 0.74
(7.45) (7.35) (7.46) (2.94) (2.99) (3.20)






Change in Private-Label, Freddie Mac & Fannie Mae Securitization 0.66 0.96
(0.11) (0.75)
Post-1998 Dummy Variable 0.62 0.63 0.61 0.15 0.14 0.14
(6.82) (6.05) (5.83) (5.66) (4.94) (4.87)
Rho 0.57 0.54 0.54 0.74 0.48 0.48
(5.64) (5.12) (5.15) (8.84) (4.43) (4.35)
R2 .87 .87 .87 .90 .90 .90
Durbin-Watson 1.70 1.67 1.68 1.51 1.53 1.55
Notes: The dependent variable is the spread of Barron’s 10-year income-property mortgage rates to 10-year Treasury yields. Models estimated with
quarterly data from the ﬁrst quarter of 1983 to the fourth quarter of 2000. Absolute value of t-Statistic is reported in parentheses under the estimated
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to the widespread turmoil in ﬁnancial markets in the second half of 1998. The
commercial property appreciation rate signiﬁcantly affected absolute spreads, but
not relative ones. The ﬁnding that increased securitization did not narrow spreads
was reafﬁrmed.
A second conﬁrmation test was conducted using the Barron’s series on all income-
property mortgages with ten-year maturities. The model actually ﬁt quite well for
these data for both relative and absolute spreads. The market credit spread and
volatility variables were signiﬁcant and of the correct sign. The two variables
capturing developments in the commercial mortgage market itself—the
commercial property appreciation rate and the post-1998 regime shift variable—
also were highly signiﬁcant. True to form, the empirical evidence once again was
not consistent with the hypothesis that increased securitization in commercial
mortgage markets have lowered credit costs.
 Conclusion
The distinguishing characteristic of the multifamily mortgage market during the
past several years has been the phenomenal growth of securitization. Taken
together, the securitization efforts of Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae and CMBS issuers
account for about two-thirds of net growth in multifamily conventional mortgage
debt outstanding since 1993. If the effects of securitization in the single-family
sector were a guide, one might expect integration of the income-property mortgage
market into the broader capital markets, a deepening of the investor base, a more
stable spread relative to a benchmark security and a lower level of mortgage rates.
A formal test of the hypothesis that securitization has had a narrowing effect on
multifamily and nonresidential mortgage rates was conducted. A reduced-form
model was estimated in which the spread over Treasury yields over time was
explained by general capital market forces—quality spreads and market
volatility—as well as by speciﬁc credit risks in commercial markets. These basic
variables went a long way in explaining variation in spreads over the 1980s and
1990s.
In contrast, a variety of tests could not establish any additional effect due to the
net growth in securitized mortgage debt. Additional research, beyond the scope
of this initial inquiry, is necessary to identify the dynamics at work. Fully speciﬁed
demand and supply equations for multifamily mortgage credit may show that the
inﬂux of new investors through securitization offset the decreased supply from
traditional portfolio investors. Without these new funding sources during the
1990s, income-property mortgage rates may well have been much higher and more
volatile relative to benchmark Treasuries than actually occurred.
Based on these preliminary results, one may conclude that the multifamily and
nonresidential mortgage market was already well integrated into general capital
markets before the recent surge in securitization and, thus, the mid-1990s
tightening in spreads would have taken place anyway. This conclusion is also110  Nothaft and Freund
consistent with earlier work that showed a fairly high level of integration. Haney,
Epley and Liano (1997) used the three Barron’s series to examine the integration
of the income-property mortgage market with the overall capital markets and
concluded that Treasury yields led commercial mortgage market yields during the
1980s but today the yields move virtually in tandem, evidence of integration of
the markets having been accomplished during the 1990s. Sa-Aadu, Shilling and
Wang (2000) model the ACLI income-property mortgage yields and arrive at a
similar conclusion, namely that the market is well integrated into the broader
capital markets in more recent times.
 Endnotes
1 See Black, Garbade and Silber (1981), Hendershott and Van Order (1989), Rothberg,
Nothaft and Gabriel (1989), Hendershott and Shilling (1989) and Cotterman and Pearce
(1996).
2 The demand for mortgage credit has been bolstered in recent years by low-income, tax
credit projects. Private construction in this segment of the market traditionally has been
difﬁcult, but the successful tax credit program has stimulated a good deal of new
construction and the concomitant demand for mortgage ﬁnancing.
3 It is worth noting that, while life insurance companies have not been aggressive
purchases of whole multifamily mortgage loans, they have added substantial volumes
of CMBS containing such loans. For instance, according to ACLI Investment Bulletin
No. IB00-013, a sample of life insurers (representing just under 60% of the industry’s
assets) reported acquiring almost $10 billion of CMBS in 1999 alone.
4 These ﬁgures reﬂect commercial banks’ acquisitions of thrifts and their assets during
this period. Mechanically, such a transaction increased the reported commercial bank
holdings as a whole.
5 It is worth noting that not all of this activity involved ‘‘pure’’ securitization. Since the
mid-1990s, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae have pursued different acquisition strategies
in their purchases of multifamily loans. Fannie Mae primarily pools their loan purchases
into mortgage-backed securities. Freddie Mac primarily purchases loans for its own
portfolio, funding those purchases through corporate debt.
6 The establishment of affordable housing goals for Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae created
additional incentive for them to increase multifamily purchases in the mid-1990s. The
Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 set interim
targets effective January 1, 1993; by regulation, HUD promulgated permanent goals
effective January 1, 1996.
7 Sa-Aadu, Shilling and Wang concatenate the ACLI’s average income-property
commitment rates for 1965–1990 with the Barron’s survey data for 1991 to 1998, and
conduct unit root tests on the mortgage rate spread to 10-year Treasury yields. They
reject the null hypothesis that the spread series has a unit root over January 1980 to
December 1998, a period roughly comparable to the one studied here; thus, their analysis
indicates that the spread time series is stationary, that is, the mean and variance of the
series is independent of time.
8 The ACLI expanded its sample from ﬁfteen to twenty life insurance companies
beginning with the ﬁrst quarter of 1979. Even with the larger sample, sample sizes wereSecuritization in Mortgage Markets  111
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small during the high-rate period of 1980 and 1981 and the ACLI did not report quarterly
averages for every quarter. However, one can obtain the averages from other data
released by the ACLI. For example, data for the second quarter of 1980 were not
published for apartment loans, but averages for the other three quarters and the year as
a whole were, allowing calculation of the missing quarter. Similar methods were used
to obtain averages for other quarters that were lacking data.
9 Barron’s data reports ﬁve-, seven- and ten-year spreads. Tests using shorter maturities
differed little from those of the ten-year spread reported, and are available from the
authors upon request.
11 For the Barron’s data, 10-year constant-maturity Treasury yields were the point of
reference. For the ACLI data, a weighted average of constant-maturity Treasury yields
was computed each quarter with average term equal to the average term of the ACLI
mortgage commitments for that quarter.
11 The NCREIF total return indexes for both income properties and apartments were also
tried. The total return measures also were signiﬁcant with the expected sign, but a better
overall ﬁt was obtained by using the appreciation rates.
12 If the error term in a regression using the individual loan-level commitment data is
homoscedastic, then grouping the data into quarterly averages where the group sizes are
unequal will result in heteroscedasticity. A direct test is to estimate the model with
grouped data by OLS and regress the square of the OLS residuals on the inverse of
group size. ACLI reports the number of loans commitments made each quarter along
with the quarterly loan averages. The resulting estimates showed heteroscedasticity in
all models in Exhibits 4–6, usually at a 99% conﬁdence level, although a couple of
models in Exhibit 6 were at a 90% level. Examples of the estimated coefﬁcient on one-
over-group size are the following (the corresponding t-Statistic is in parenthesis): Exhibit
4, column 1: 0.032 (8.57); Exhibit 5, column 1: 4.937 (16.27); Exhibit 6, column 1:
42.28 (3.68); and Exhibit 6, column 4: 0.315 (1.91).
13 When lagged two quarters, both the private-label securitization and the variable
combined with Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae activity were still insigniﬁcant, although
the signs were negative in seven of the eight models. Other measures of the market
share of multifamily mortgages being securitized were tested without signiﬁcantly
different results. One measure was the ratio of amount of debt in CMBS to total
multifamily debt outstanding (and the comparable measure inclusive of Freddie Mac
and Fannie Mae). An alternative measure was the ratio of quarterly net change in debt
held in private-label pools to the quarterly net change in multifamily debt outstanding
(and the comparable measure inclusive of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae).
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